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AGE DISCRIMINATION
"Take the Money and Run - Please": Severance
Payments and Waiver-of-Claim Clauses Under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act
by Alison Barnes
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 68-71. © 1997 American Bar Association.
IssuE
Can a right-to-sue waiver that fails
to meet the requirements of the
Age Discrimination in Employment
Act bar an ex-employee's age dis-
crimination suit against a former
employer because the ex-employee
failed to return or offer to return a
severance payment given in
exchange for the waiver?
FACTS
Dolores Oubre, the petitioner,
worked for Entergy Operations, Inc.
("Entergy"), an electric company
and the respondent, for more than
six years, beginning in June 1987.
Oubre progressed from an hourly
wage position as a clerk to that of
computer operator and in 1992 was
promoted to computer operator II.
In 1994, Oubre and others in her
department received the title of
assistant outage scheduler and
became salaried personnel. Oubre's
evaluations in the two years prior to
the incidents at issue, involving
some similar duties and perfor-
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mance criteria, were very positive.
At the end of her employment for
Entergy, Oubre was 41.
In late 1994, Entergy's management
instituted a new employee evalua-
tion system, the Management
Planning and Review Ranking
Process, to evaluate salaried, man-
agerial, and professional employees.
Under the new evaluation system,
all employees would be ranked in
relation to their peers on two fac-
tors - performance and potential
for promotion.
Each employee's ranking was con-
verted into one of nine groups, the
lowest of which ("group nine") was
mandated to include 10 percent of
the ranked employees. Employees
in group nine could be terminated
without severance pay at any time
in the year after the ranking
occurred. Group nine employees
were to be given individual action
plans devised by Entergy, apparent-
ly to identify areas of improvement
required for continued employment.
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However, even those who met
all the goals of an employee-
improvement action plan were
not guaranteed continued employ-
ment or severance benefits in the
event of termination.
Evaluated against all salaried, non-
managerial employees in her depart-
ment, Oubre was ranked in group
nine. On January 17, 1995, Oubre's
department manager told her of the
ranking and that if she again ranked
in group nine the following year, she
would be terminated immediately
and without benefits. The manager
also told Oubre that if she contin-
ued with Entergy, an action plan
would be developed for her. The
manager explained that if she failed
to meet the goals of the plan, she
would be terminated immediately.
The manager then presented Oubre
with a voluntary severance package
that included a payment of $6,258,
which represented one month of
administrative leave plus one week's
pay for every year of her employ-
ment with Entergy. She was told to
take time off from work to consider
her decision.
Meeting again with management on
January 31, Oubre was told it would
be virtually impossible for her to
improve her ranking, ensuring she
would be terminated without bene-
fits in the near future. Oubre then
agreed to waive all legal claims
against Entergy by signing a docu-
ment that recited that she was
advised to consult an attorney, had
no less than 14 days in which to
consider the matter, and received
valuable consideration to which she
would not otherwise be entitled.
The waiver, however, did not state
that among the claims being
released were all claims that might
exist under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967, as
amended ("ADEA"). 29 U.S.C. §§
621-634 (1994).
Entergy paid Oubre the agreed
severance amount over a period of
six months. At her deposition,
Oubre declined to return the sever-
ance payment. She explained that
subsequent jobs provided less than
half of her former income, and she
"would have to think really hard"
and "weigh the consequences"
before taking the amount from her
savings that she was using for part
of her monthly living expenses.
Shortly after her departure from
Entergy, Oubre filed an age discrim-
ination charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity
Commission (the "EEOC"), the
federal agency that implements the
ADEA. The EEOC determined it had
insufficient evidence to make a
determination on Oubre's charge.
Oubre then filed an age discrimina-
tion suit against Entergy in federal
district court. In an unreported
decision, the district court dis-
missed the case on Entergy's motion
for summary judgment (see
Glossary). In so ruling, the court
acknowledged that the waiver of
claims Oubre signed did not satisfy
the ADEA because it made no
mention that ADEA claims were
covered, but concluded that the
waiver was effective to bar her suit
because she had not returned or
attempted to return the severance
payment. The Fifth Circuit affirmed
in an unpublished order.
The case is now before the Supreme
Court, which granted Oubre's
petition for a writ of certiorari.
117 S. Ct. 1466 (1997).
CASE ANALYSIS
Oubre seeks damages (see Glossary)
under the ADEA, which prohibits
discrimination by employers on the
basis of age against employees and
applicants for employment in the
protected class, age 40 and over.
In order to prevent employers from
pressuring employees into choices
against their interests, the ADEA
was amended in 1990 by the addi-
tion of Section 7(f), known as Title
II of the Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(f),
which provides that an individual
may not waive any right to bring
any claim under the ADEA unless
the waiver is knowing and
voluntary.
Section 7(f) recites a number of
requirements for a knowing and
voluntary waiver of ADEA claims,
including a requirement that the
affected employee be told expressly
that the waiver covers claims under
the ADEA. In addition, Section 7(f)
requires that the employee be given
at least 21 days to consider the
waiver and 45 days in which to con-
sider any waiver requested in con-
nection with an exit incentive
offered to a group or class of
employees. Section 7(f) further
provides that in any dispute that
may arise over whether a waiver
satisfies its requirements, the party
asserting the validity of a waiver -
the employer - has the burden of
proving that the waiver was
knowing and voluntary.
Oubre, who must defeat the waiver
in order to proceed with her ADEA
suit, has Section 7(f) squarely on
her side. But Entergy, which must
protect the waiver or defend itself at
trial, has the common law, tender
back doctrine on its side.
The tender back doctrine is a prin-
ciple of contract law. It prohibits a
party to a contract - the waiver in
this case - from challenging the
validity of the contract after
receiving a benefit - the severance
payment - unless the party first
returns, or attempts to return
(tender back), the benefit.
The circuit courts of appeals are
divided over application of the doc-
(Continued on Page 70)
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trine in cases involving an invalid
waiver of ADEA rights. The Fifth
Circuit in this case and the Fourth
Circuit, Blistein v. St. John's
College, 74 F.3d 1459 (4th Cir.
1996), hold that an invalid waiver
under the ADEA is merely voidable,
not void. When a former employee
retains severance funds, according
to the Fifth Circuit, the voidable
waiver is ratified and becomes bind-
ing. To void a waiver that fails to
meet the requirements of Section
7(0, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits
require the former employee to
return or offer to return any funds
received in exchange for the waiver.
As the Fifth Circuit said in Wamsley v.
Champlin Refining & Chemicals,
Inc., 11 F.3d 534 (5th Cir. 1993),
retaining severance benefits consti-
tutes a choice not to void an invalid
release and is a new promise not
subject to the waiver requirements
of Section 7(0.
Other circuits, however, have held
that Section 7(f) supersedes the
tender back doctrine. The Seventh
Circuit, for example, in Oberg v.
Allied Van Lines, Inc., 11 F.3d 679
(7th Cir. 1993), observed that
Section 7(0 plainly restricts an
employee's freedom to waive his
or her rights under the ADEA.
Recently the Third Circuit, in Long
v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 105 F.3d
1529 (3d Cir. 1997), said still more
clearly that unless the enumerated
requirements of Section 7(0 are
met, an individual may not waive
ADEA rights.
The principal Supreme Court case
explicating similar issues is Hogue v.
Southern Railway Co., 390 U.S. 516
(1968), which held that an employ-
ee was not required to tender back
the consideration he had received
from his employer in exchange for a
release of claims as a condition for
suing the employer under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act
("FELA"). 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60.
Applying federal law and excluding
state common law, the Court con-
cluded that requiring a tender back
as a prerequisite to suit under FELA
is contrary to the policy of the
statute - to provide an injured
employee a right to recover for
injuries negligently inflicted by his
or her employer. The employer's
payment was to be deducted from
any recovery the employee might
obtain in a FELA suit.
Under Section 7(f) as noted above,
Oubre's waiver cannot be consid-
ered valid at the time of execution
because the minimum statutory
requirements for a knowing and vol-
untary waiver were not met. About
this there is little dispute. The par-
ties agree that the waiver failed to
make specific reference to ADEA
rights and that the waiting periods
were not met. Thus Oubre's right to
maintain her ADEA suit against
Entergy depends on the validity of
her waiver in light of having taken a
severance payment and not return-
ing or offering to return it.
Oubre asserts that her waiver was
not knowing and voluntary in fact
or in law and that failure to return
the severance payment cannot
validate an invalid waiver. She con-
tends that Section 7(f)'s minimum
requirements for a valid waiver of
ADEA rights are intended to dis-
place any presumptions that an
individual ratified a waiver because
of a failure to tender back payment.
The legislative history of Section
7(0 appears to support Oubre's
view. Prior to its enactment, the
EEOC had promulgated a regulation
that permitted knowing and
voluntary waivers of ADEA
claims without EEOC supervision.
Congress considered the EEOC
rule contrary to law and suspended
its implementation.
A variety of rules and bills followed
proposing more limited circum-
stances for waiver. The result was
Section 7(0.
Oubre also argues that the Hogue
rationale should apply because the
ADEA is a federal remedial statute
like FELA, designed to compensate
employees and deter employers
from engaging in the prohibited
conduct. Oubre maintains that the
tender back requirement would be
contrary to the purposes of the
ADEA because an employer could
escape sanctions when a terminated
employee lacks resources to return
severance benefits. Indeed, an
employer might be encouraged to
omit specific provisions about ADEA
rights with the expectation that by
the time the employee discovers
that the waiver is invalid, he or she
is in no position to tender back.
Entergy responds that the initial
failure to comply with the ADEA is
not dispositive; rather, it is Oubre's
failure to return the severance pay-
ment that caused the invalid waiver
to become binding on her.
The tender back principle, Entergy
argues, applies to ADEA claims
because the statute does not
address the issue directly, and the
purposes and legislative history of
the ADEA as amended by Section
7(f) do not forbid application of the
principle. Entergy looks to Wamsley,
citing the Fifth Circuit's assertion
that Congress' failure to use the
term void is significant.
Abrogation of the tender back
doctrine, Entergy argues, should be
rejected because it would allow
employees such as Oubre to engage
in a form of fraud by accepting
severance payments while planning
to sue. Here Entergy references
Oubre's consultation with two
lawyers before accepting the sever-
ance offer and throughout the pay-
Issue No. 2
out period as evidence of her
intention to sue and of bad-faith
acceptance. As a matter of public
policy, Entergy contends, employers
would be deterred from reaching
out-of-court settlements, contrary to
the ADEA's explicit preference for
voluntary settlement of age
discrimination disputes.
Finally, Entergy argues, if the Court
does not choose to apply the tender
back doctrine, it should recognize
an employee-fraud exception
whenever the employer can show
that the employee accepted a sever-
ance payment while planning to
sue. Under such an exception, an
employee who takes the money
while intending to sue, and then
does sue, would be required to give
the money back before proceeding.
SIGNIFICANCE
Entergy's position asks the Supreme
Court to sanction to some degree
employers who withhold informa-
tion from employees that is required
by the ADEA. In other words, there
is a real risk that a decision apply-
ing the tender back doctrine to an
employee's waiver of ADEA rights
will encourage employers to with-
hold information required by the
ADEA. That, in turn, would make it
easier for employers to pressure
older employees into accepting
severance packages, taking the risk
that the severance money will be
spent before an employee discovers
that the waiver is invalid. For many
older workers who may have a more
difficult time finding work than
younger ones, giving back a
severance payment often is
impossible.
The proposed employee-fraud
exception might soften the impact
of rejecting the tender back rule.
However, it would add an additional
layer of dispute to an ADEA lawsuit,
a result Congress probably did not
contemplate. Moreover, the excep-
tion simply is not needed if an
employer complies with the
requirements of Section 7(f).
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